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The Role of Basic Values in the Contemporary
Constitutional Hermeneutics
of Germany and the United States
William Joseph Wagnee

The idea of
mount text can

written constitution

a

place

state

values, which experience shows

good

promises

that respect for a parapolitical and human

power in the service of
to

be essential

order. Constitutionalism&apos;s value lies

in

to

society&apos;s happiness

the basic ends

it

and

advances.

sanguine prospects contemplate with envy the relative
stability, prosperity, and freedom of the German and American constitutional systems. Looking beyond the obvious, threshold significance of
fidelity to the constitutional text, one is stimulated to ponder the more
comprehensive schemes of basic value these two systems offer as internal
measures of their justification.
Nations with less

German and
While it is fair to conclude that the two constitutions
advance kindred political and human values, it is also inescap-

American

-

they do so in different ways. The differences, both conceptual
and practical, reflect differing legal cultures, disparate historical experience, and even substantively diverging visions of the ideal human society.
A dialectic of contrast challenges each system to discover its stengths and
weaknesses, as well as the distinctive challenges lying before it in a rnoment of far-reaching and rapid political, social, and economic change.
able that

*
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October 12, 1995. The article was written as Guest Research Fellow in residence at the Max
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-
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high
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by exploring two recurring
charged with reviewing

courts

constitutional issues in the two countries. One theme which it will address for this purpose is the role of basic values in determining the
scope
and structure of governmental power, specifically that of the federal legislature. The other is the role they have in resolving conflicts between individual dissent and legislative decision over &quot;public morality,&quot; in particular, the public regulation of abortion. Both themes recommend themselves
for

use in

of the

the present context, because central
courts; the focus of controversies

to

the

recent

jurisprudence

both countries

over the
value-basis of constitutional order; and, by nature, in any case suited to
fruitful theoretical reflection on the role of basic values in constitutional

two

in

adjudication.
The German Constitutional Court&apos;s Maastricht

Treaty judgement of
parliamentary power to cede authority
Union,1 a German question arising in the relatively
recent past, lends itself to comparative analysis in connection with the
first theme, when placed in profile against the American Supreme Court&apos;s
decision in United States v. Lopez of April 26, 1995 on the
scope of
Congress&apos;s power over state-level affairs, 2 a longerstanding American
problem. The German Court&apos;s Second Abortion decision, of May 2, 1992,3
forms the obvious choice for a study of the second theme, as compared
to the American Court&apos;s holding in Casey v. Planned Parenthood
of
Southeastern Pennsylvania, decided June 29, 1992.4
October 12, 1993
to the European

A theoretical

interpretation

exploring

the

on

the scope of

statement

within the

meaning

of the role of basic values in constitutional

two

of the

systems offers a preliminary foundation for
cases. Clarification of the
meaning of the

cases, in turn, prepares

the ground for
lessons of contemporary comparative
constitutionaliSM.5

1
2
3
4

BVerfGE 89,155, 11.
115 S. Ct. 1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626
BVerfGE 88, 203, IL

some

conclusions about the specific
for American and German

analysis

(1995).

505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct.

2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992). The treatment of abortion has
useful point of reference in recent comparisons of German and American
legal systems. See, e.g., Mary Ann G I e n d o n, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law
(1987); Donald P. K o m m e r s, The Constitutional Law of Abortion in Germany: Should
Americans Pay Attention?, 10 journal of Contemporary Health Law and
Policy 1 (1994).
been found

a

5
Both German and American legal systems are sufficiently pluralistic that
many aspects
of the judicial decisions considered in the course of this article could
conceivably have been
decided differently in some cases, in fact, they could even have resembled holdings which
-
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L The Role

of BasIC

Values

in

the German

and American Constitutional Frameworks
A theoretical

constitutional

statement

of the role of basic values

in a

given

system of

of basic values

the

calls for attention

to
place
methodology which the Court charged with
finally adjudicating constitutional disputes applies in interpreting the text;
and the ontological, societal, or political terms in which that Court envisions basic values as being concretely realized through its adjudications.

interpretation

in the constitutional text; the

In the German system, the constitutional text presents a detailed array
of values, which it propounds as corresponding to an objective moral order.6 The value of the dignity of the human person forms the text&apos;s leit-

dignity is represented as flowing from the inherent status of
persons as beings whose fulfillment lies in self-realization through autonomous moral choice, political participation, and social solidarity.8
The part of individual dignity lying in autonomous self-realization is
expressed principally through the concept of basic rights.9 The portion
found in political participation is communicated primarily through that of
militant democracy.10 The aspect equated with social solidarity is honored
Motif.7

This

the article
kind of

cross-cultural counterpositions. The article does
necessity required the holdings to turn

treats as

historical

immanent

does presuppose that law has a historical character ensuring that
America continue to represent separate legal cultures, as they do

bringing

with them

new

similarities, will take

on

as

at

coloration from

not assume

that

some

they did, but it
long as Germany and

out as

present, even reversals
deeper orientations to

concepts and values keeping the meaning of outcomes distinguishable. Compare Fr. C. v.
S a v i g n y, System des heutigen R6mischen Rechts, 212 passim (Berlin 1840).
6
Konrad H e s s e, Grundziige des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
118 -19, 124

interpret
P. K
859

-

the

o in in e r

-

7

61

s,

to which judges are competent creatively to
changing circumstances is contested. Donald
Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 Emory Law Journal 837,

ed.

(19th

27

content

1993). The degree

of these

German

rights

in

(1991).

Grundgesetz

Art. 1 Abs. 1; Klaus S t

der Grundrechte,

in:

Josef

e r

n,

Idee der Menschenrechte und Positivität

Isensee/Paul Kirchhof

[eds.],

5 Handbuch des Staatsrechts

4-8(1992).
8

Peter H ä b

e r

1

e,

Die Menschenwürde als

Grundlage

der staatlichen

Gemeinschaft, in:

Isensee/Kirchhof (note 7) 828 33 (1987).
9
Grundgesetz Art. 1-19; more precisely, the relevant concept is one of the &quot;subjective&quot;
exercise of rights, &quot;als subjekte, statusbegriindende Rechte sind die Grundrechte v e r f a s
-

-

sungsrechtliche
Hesse
10

(note 6),

at

Grundgesetz

Demokratie

Fundamentalrechte des Einzelnen als Mensch und als

Bürger&quot;,

121.

Art. 20 Abs. 4, 21 and 38. See

generally

Eckhard J

e s s

e,

Streitbare

(1980).
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and the United States

under the rubric of the social state.1 1 The value of law

as an

inherently

ap-

of supporting all of these values is expressed in the conpropriate
of
the
rule
of law.12 The particular channels and prerogatives of
cept
means

power the

alism,

or

deriving

as

centered

out, whether

lays

text

the individual

on

standing

essential meaning in relation to this
the dignity of the human person.13

The German Constitutional Court&apos;s
stitutional

which

same

methodology

for

scheme of values

adjudicating

con-

that material conflicts arising in changing cirallow the specification of the concrete content of the basic val-

disputes

cumstances

to separation of powers, federconstitutional claims, are offered

relating

to assert

assumes

first

principles with the text. Specific disputes are
implicating more than one basic value, but the
Court assumes that principles also exist for allocating concrete burdens
towards their resolution, to ensure that the core meaning of all implicated
values can be vindicated in every circumstance with no essential qualificaues

are

given

as

acknowledged as capable

of

14

tion.

Based

on

confidence in the essential

tive moral order
concrete

realization

contribute

fying

existing beyond

to a

unity

and

knowability

of

an

objec-

the constitutional text, and amenable
the Court aims, in each case before it,

through law,
more general statement

of

concrete

rights

to
to

and duties satis-

the demands of the constitutional scheme of values.

the Court aims

at a

comprehensive

and coherent

Cumulatively,
conceptualization of the

fullest

implications of the constitutional value order in relation to all configurations of fact yet within its notice. This textually grounded concept
of the Court&apos;s task explains, for example, the Court&apos;s issuance of decisions
abstract

over

11

issues

Grundgesetz

outside of &quot;the

concrete case or

controversy&quot; require-

Art. 20 Abs. I and Art. 28 Abs. 1; Ekkehart S t e i n, Staatsrecht 170 -178

(14th ed. 1993).
12
Grundgesetz Art. 20 Abs. 3; Volkmar G 6 t z, Legislative and Executive Power under
the Constitutional Requirements entailed in the Principle of the Rule of Law, in: Christian
Starck [ed.], New Challenges to the German Basic Law (1991), 141-166.
13
E.g., Grundgesetz Art. 30, 31, 33, 38, 50, 54 &amp; 93. &quot;Die verfassungsrechtfiche
Betrachtung karm rucht an einen &apos;vorverfassungsmAigen&apos; Bundesstaatsbegriff anknilpfen.
Eine solche Ankniipfung ist ihr um so mehr verwehrt, als der fiir sie maggebliche Begriff
des Bundesstaates em normativer Begriff ist&quot;, H e s s e (note 6), at 89.
14

The German constitutional tradition

the

polar oppposite of community, but
within community&quot;. W. Cole Durham,
as

is one
as

a

&quot;in which freedom tends

value that

must

to

be

be achieved in

seen not

synthesis

General Assessment of the Basic Law
An
American View, in Kommers, Donald P. and Kirchhof, Paul (eds.), Germany and Its Basic
Law 45 (1993); see also S tei n (note 11), at 230
233, and H es s e (note 6), at 129 -138.
-

-
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bounding

ment

the American

Supreme

Court&apos;s

termed abstrakte Normenkontrolle.15
As the realization of value occurring

judicial

through

its

power, in what

is

adjudicative activity,

the Court envisions the actual flourishing of individual human personal16
ity in a context of embodied social and political accountability. It con-

adjudication to effectuate that flourishing, not only through its
coherent articulation and concrete enforcement of constitutional rights
and duties, but also by the common moral interpretation of changing circumstances and the more effective avenues of political decision and govsiders its

ernmental administration, which it offers
ation for the

common

In the American
ments

establish

more or

less

conceived
tent

guide general

societal cooper-

good.

scheme, the

different

written

emphasis.

constitution and

The

text

its

key

amend-

expresses the values of

a

-

utilitarian notion of welfare; fairness; and individual liberty,
governmental intrusion. The substantive conenumerated for Congress in Article 1,17 the aptness of

-

as

a

to

freedom from

of the powers
presidency for

executing laws and policies set out in Article 11,18 and
Sua unitary jurisprudence established by provision for a
of
The
all
III
Article
majority
principle
express utility.19
preme Court in
rule of Article 1,20 the procedural protections in the Bill of RightS,21 and
the

the basis for

the

guarantees of the XIV Amendment22
fairness. The separation and division of powers concepts of

equal protection and due process

communicate

Grundgesetz Art. 93 Abs. 1- 3; Klaus S c h 1 a i c h, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht
(2d ed. 1991).
16
&quot;In the reality of its constitutional life,&quot; Germany is &quot;a state which has taken
seriously its obligation to create favorable external conditions for its citizens to achieve a
life inconformity with human dignity.&quot; KurtSontheimer, Principles of HumanDignity
in the Federal Republic, in: Kommers/Kirchhof (note 14), at 216.
15

77

-

82

17

U.S. Const.

art.

1, 5

18

U.S. Const.

art.

II.

8.

art. 111, 5 1. Winfried B r u g g e r observes that the classical utilitarianism
h a in reflects the kind of ideas which historically influenced the developAdam S rn i t h and John
ment of the American system, along with related strands in
L o c k e. Winfried B r u g g e r, Grundrechte und Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in den Verei19

of

U.S. Const.

Jeremy

B

e nt

nigten Staaten von Amerika 421- 22 (1987).
20 U.S. Const.
art. 1, 55 2, 3 &amp; 5.
21
E.g., U.S. Const. amend. IV, V, VI, VII, &amp; VIII.
22

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, S 1. On fairness as a basic constitutional value in the United
79 (1980).
see John Hart E I y, Democracy and Distrust 135

States,

-
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of the Constitution,23 along with the Bill of
individual liberty.24

body

ties,

Germany

Rights&apos;s

civil liber-

are meant to serve

The

interpretive methodology of the American Supreme Court is
to refereeing power in shifting circumstances to ensure these
basic
values of governmental efficiency, fairness, and individual ausame
tonomy. Where conflicts arise between the first and third goals, the Court
generally gives concrete priority to individual autonomy, except where
concerns relating to utility reach an intensity considered compelling.25
Guided by a skeptical moral and political epistemology, the Court prefers plural and conflicting justifications for many of its concrete holdings.
It relies on the stability of precedent and the practical success of governoriented

ment,

ings,

than on common appropriation of abstract concepts or meanvalidate its work.26 Where the Court&apos;s members offer more theo-

more

to

retical

justifications

of their decisions, they tend to ground them in the inor on the formal scope of isolated conceptS,28

tention of the founderS27

rather than

23

more

substantive

or

systematic

notions of value.

Elements include bicameralism and

presidential veto, U.S. Const. art. 1, 5 7; the
of federal powers, art. 1, 11, &amp; III; and the division of state and federal power,
amend. X. James M a d i s o n alluded to this core value of the separation of governmental
in the same hands, whether
powers, when he stated: &quot;The accumulation of all powers,
of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
separation

pronounced,
245

-

24

46

(2d

the very definition of
ed.

tyranny&quot;,

Max Beloff

[ed.], The Federalist

No. XLVIII

1987).

U.S. Const. amend. I-X.

25

In this process, the Court both identifies individual interests constituting protectible
liberties and governmental interests compelling enough sometimes to outweigh them.
Korematsu

v.

United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 65 S. Ct. 193, 194, 89 L. Ed. 194 (1944). By
S t o n e&apos;s footnote 4 in the case of United States v. Carolene Products Co.,

default, justice

304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4, 58 S. Ct.

778, 783 84 n.4, 82 L. Ed. 1234 (1938), generally is taken
schema of the diverse ways in which individual rights may take priority over majoritarian decision. For contemporary interpretations, see David L. F a i
g in a n, Reconciling
-

as a

Individual

Rights and Government Interests: Madisonian Principles Versus Supreme Court
Virginia Law Review 1521 (1992), and T. Alexander A I e i n i k o f f, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale Law journal 943 (1987).
26
Winfried B r u g g e r expresses this point as follows: &quot;e in p 1 r i s c h hangt viel von der
Frage ab, ob von der judikative, der Exekutive oder der Legislative mehr Tyrannei oder
Machtmißbrauch zu erwarten ist. Solche streitigen und nach historischer Lage wechselnden
Practice,

78

Urteile bestimmen auch das Verständnis institutioneller

19),

at

27

Kompetenzen&quot;,

B

r u

gge

r

(note

355.

A

advanced in a well known form by Robert H. B or k, The Tempting of
(1990).
28
justice B I a c k offers perhaps the clearest case, assuming that the conceptual content
of the text is self-interpreting. See, e.g., Youngstown Sbeet &amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer 343
U.S. 579, 582, 72 S. Ct. 863, 864, 96 L. Ed. 1153 (1952) and Hugo L. B I a c k, A Constitu-

position

America
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As the social and

adjudication, the Court exgovernmental interference,
social, commercial, and political exchange satisfying

political

outcome

of its

of individual decisions free of

pects a plenum
and a flourishing of

popular preferences. The Court&apos;s tools to these ends include the guarantee of a plurality of governmental powers, but also of moral and religious
societal perspectives;29 a common language of utility; and governmental
be practically effective, but suffiorgans functioning sufficiently well to
threaten
in
no definitive substitution of the
to
ciently uncertain
scope
decisions of the collective will for those of

autonomous

individuals

or

the

form.

they freely
comparative perspective, the German constitutional scheme affirms basic values as inherently worthwhile moral ends, while the American scheme treats them as the functional requisites of the freedom and
wealth believed to be conducive to an individualized pursuit of happiness.
Germany ordains constitutional interpretation to the discovery of the
meaning of concrete situations for a project of common governmental and
societal cooperation towards realizing objective values. America directs it
to finding the material opportunities in changing circumstances for
society and individuals alike to multiply wealth and to realize the diverse
associations
From

a

projects of the individual imagination.
A comparison of the cases selected treating the scope of national legislative power and the regulation of public morality will serve to test and
confirm the validity of this account, identify its implications for the treatment

of

concrete issues

a more

permit
before each.

informed

of contemporary import in the two systems, and
judgment about stress and opportunity currently

tional Faith (1968), but so-called the derivation of extratextual meaning in relation to the
fourteenth amendment concept of liberty by a Justice Douglas or Brennan in the
context of the &quot;new substantive due process&quot; also reflects reliance on isolated concepts. The
approach of justice D o u g I a s or B r e n n a n differs from that of Justice B I a c k merely by
acknowledging that the meaning attributed to such concepts does not reside in the text as
such. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 1679, 14 L.
Ed. 2d 510 (1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 1031, 31 L.
Ed. 2d 349

(1972).

focus in both the establishment and free exercise clauses of
was given classic expression by justice Jackson: &quot;If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
other matters of
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.&quot; West Virginia Board
29

This

jurisprudence

finds

a

the first amendment. Its central idea

of Education

v.

Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 1187, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943).
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The exercise of

Germany and the United

Scope of Federal LegislatiVe

governmental

power is

not

taken for

185

States

Power

granted

under

a

constitution, but requires justification. Recognized forms of such justification in both Germany and America appeal to basic values, although
these may be

given

or reasons

statement

variously

substantive

underlying purgovernmental power. Bethe legislative branch originates new law and the national legislature
has global impact, the scope of national legislative power has special importance for the meaning of basic constitutional values in both systems.
poses

as

for the differential allocation of

cause

The German
In its 1993 Maastricbt

Experience

Treaty judgment

on

Germany&apos;s

accession

to

the

European Union, the German Constitutional Court ruled on the scope of
federal parliamentary power. In so doing, it fashioned a unique opportu-

nity for practical insight into how contemporary Germany justifies national legislative power in relation to basic constitutional values.
To reach its judgement in the case, the Court treated federal parliamentary power, both with respect to internal scope and external limitation by
other elements of governmental structure, as a matter, not so much of positive constitutional provision, as of basic constitutional value. The Court&apos;s
chosen point of departure was the value of democracy, more specifically,
democracy from the angle of the individual&apos;s right to participate in legislative decisionmaking through meaningful representation. 30 The Court
interpreted the Federal Parliament&apos;s delegation of aspects of its authority
to the European Union as implicating this value.
It found Parliament&apos;s enactment compatible with the individual
German&apos;s right to participate in democracy and, thus, to be constitutional,
on the grounds that the delegation had been defined with sufficient
specificity to reserve essential democratic decisionmaking to the national legislative body,31 and that the supranational body on which authority was
conferred advanced democracy, commensurate with the scope of the delegation.32
The Court recognized the rule of law as a second implicated value. The
issue was whether a body standing outside the German framework of law
-

30

31
32

BVerfGE 89, 155, H (171).
Id. at 18 1.
Id.
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such, could be eligible

to

bear the values

constituting the constitutional

order.33 Neither the openness of the Basic Law

amble and Articles
nor

to

through

its

original

Pre34

authority to supranational bodies,
Basic Law expressly to permit Germany&apos;s

the transfer of

the later amendment of the
to the European Union

by the Court to resolve the
question.35 Parliament&apos;s act of accession was upheld as constitutional, but
only because the Court specifically found it compatible with the structural legal integrity of German constitutionalism, considered as a basic
accession

was

found

value.
To reach its conclusion that accession did

not

threaten the rule of law

the Court conas a value constitutive of the German constitutional order,
Maastricht
the
under
Treaty narstrued the delegation of power occurring
that it permitted termination of membership by legislative
of member states, with at least studied ambiguity about whether such
termination could be effectuated by the German Parliament acting unilaterally;36 that the implementation of acts of the Union violative of the conand
crete order of basic values in Germany could be annulled by itself;37

rowly, holding
act

that the Union lacked power to reach either original, nondelegated democratic judgements affecting Germany,38 or to allocate, in any definitive
jurisdictional competences between itself and Germany or other
way,

member states.39
these conclusions, the Court did more than merely confirm
the scope of German legislative power within some existing allocation of
It interpreted the Treaty as well as the German Basic Law, to arIn

reaching

power.
rive at an

original account of the entire supranational framework of power
legislative power would fit, assuming due respect
for German constitutional principles. An opinion, purporting on its face
in fact
to clarify the nature of a national &quot;part&quot; of European integration,
&quot;whole&quot;.
the
addressed the shape of
supranational
Significantly, the Court accomplished this constructive effort, only by
sidestepping the issue of whether moments of constitutional decision

within which German

33

Id.

34

Grundgesetz
Grundgesetz

35

at

188.

Priambel and Art. 24 Abs. 1.
Art. 23 Abs. 1.

36

BVerfGE 89, 155, Il (190, 207).
Id. at 174 -175, 178; the opinion continues
Constitutional Court commenced in its decisions in
37

Solange H,

BVerfGE 73, 339

38

Id.

at

191-192.

39

Id.

at

197.

a

discussion on this point which the
BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974), and

Solange I,

(1986).
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giving democracy precedence

over the ordinary rule of
judgements over the shape of the &quot;whole&quot;
might be placed beyond its own purvieW.40 The Court&apos;s evasion cannot be
taken to imply insistence that consent to constitutional change need always occur through pre-existing legal channels, for the &quot;consent&quot; giving
the Basic Law,its own legitimacy has never been given by
any established
form of plebiscite, or the like.41 Germany&apos;s own experience
argues, in fact,
for the derivation of constitutional authority from the
customary obserof
form.
over
time,
vance,
overarching legal

law,

not

so

that constitutional

It would be error,

as

well,

to

interpret the

Court&apos;s choice of

not

acknowledging the possibility that democracy, under some circumstances,
preempts the ordinary rule of law in a process of gradual, not less than
radical revolution, as constituting a reactionary political intervention on
behalf of the German Mark or the country&apos;s &quot;biirgerlichen Wohlstand.&quot;
The Court&apos;s decision rests neither on positivistic regard for existing German constitutional form, nor
power-political regard for Germany&apos;s material interests, but on its evaluation of the ripeness of a European constitutional moment for realizing objective constitutional values. Its elevation
of rule of law considerations represent its prudential regard, informed
by
historical memory, for the seriousness of
constitutionalism.

galloping

inflation&apos;s threat

to

The

recognition that lies at the opinion&apos;s heart that fidelity to the rule
of law may impose requirements on the mode in which democratic even
constitutional
consent is expressed, finds its true ground in the Court&apos;s
-

-

prudential judgement

of the

the

of either

perpetuation,

not

of contemporary circumstances for
democracy or the rule of law alone, but

meaning

inclusive of all the values of the constitutional order. The Court reasoned,
in effect, that democracy&apos;s expression as a value must be
pursued w i t h i n

existing legal categories,

until conditions ensure that entry, whether fordifferent
constitutional order has, not only the sufa
informal,
ficient popular consent to validate the value of democracy as such, but, in
mal

into

or

40

The Court does not openly acknowledge another side to the
&quot;dynamism&quot; that it adshapes the European Union&apos;s self-concept, id. at 184, and asserts merely that the democratic impulse must be channelled in the European context
through national parliaments,
since the national legislatures are the &quot;masters of the
Treaty&quot;, id. at 185.
mits

41

Klaus S t e r n, General Assessment of the Basic Law
a German View, in: Kommers/Kirchhof (note 14), at 20; it has been pointed out that a
&quot;Volksabstimmung&quot; in the
context of the reunification of Germany could have created the
impression of a &quot;Legitimationsdefizit&quot; in the German &quot;Grundgesetz&quot;, Matthias Herdegen, Die
-

Verfassungs-

Hnderungen

im

Einigungsvertrag

32

(1991).
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fact, sufficiently safeguards the whole objective constellation of values of
the constitutional order.42

The

nature

of the

prudential judgement underlying

the opinion has

im-

portant ramifications for the meaning of the specific structures the Court
outlines allocating power between the European Union and the organs of
German constitutional government. Descriptive and evaluative criteria for

evaluating these proposals must, namely, be formuregard for the distinctive interpretive role which this
prudential judgement brings to expression. American notions of longterm
pragmatic workability would clearly be misplaced if applied as a criterion
for understanding or evaluating the German Court&apos;s proposals.
The Court&apos;s role, which the prudential judgement in the case exemplifies, Is one of contributing to a common societal appropriation of basic
values through reason and responsible moral decision that transcends any
purely formal allocation of jurisdiction. This role is incompatible with
permanent service as the gatekeeper over the power to advance intereStS.43
Although questions of value and authority unavoidably blur with those of
power and interest in discussions of national sovereignty, the former and

understanding

and

lated with due

not

the latter form the German Court&apos;s ultimate frame of reference.

A

correlary

of the

tenet

of the

objectivity of basic values characterizing
accessibility of such values to

German constitutionalism is the universal

appropriation. The model within which the Court sets forth
analysis in the opinion is thus one ultimately oriented to
common cooperation for the good, based in reason, not a final allocation
of jurisdictional competencies, even that framed by current constitutional
law itself. The Court knows itself to be taking part in a cooperative
dialogue for the common good, already occurring, in fact, if not yet law,
on the supranational level. Rather than to stake out a permanent role for
itself as the gatekeeper of power, the Court means to invite a transformation, if possible, of the relevant factual premises of discussion, through an
reasonable

its structural

42

provision most closely linked to the Court&apos;s mandate in this regard
&quot;eternity clause&quot; of Art. 79 Abs. 3. As illustrated in this case, the Court&apos;s
this regard is, notwithstanding its positive proposals, more fundamentally, a

The constitutional

is the so-called

function in

the constitutional limits of further
Matthias H e r d e g e n, Maastricht
and the German Constitutional Court: Constitutional Restraints for an &quot;Ever Closer

negative one: &quot;The judgment
European integration beyond

Union&quot;,

leaves the discussion

Maastricht

on

entirely open&quot;,

31 Common Market Law Review

235, 249 (1994).

43

The role the Court claims for itself both with respect to passing on basic rights questions and delegations of legislative authority creates this appearance. BVerfGE 89, 155 11,

(174

-

75, 178, 190, 207).
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the United States

realization of basic values

the obsolescence of its

its basic

Germany and

allocation of

foreseeably bringing

competencies, but

not

methodology.
The American

Experience

holding on national legislative power which is nearest to
Treaty case in its contemporary comparative significance is
United States v. Lopez, which the United States Supreme Court decided
this past April. The context the inverse of the German holding&apos;s in two
respects was the relationship of central to regional power, at a time long
subsequent to, rather than immediately before, the adoption of a plan of
political integration. While Germans show little desire broadly to import
American federalistic structures to Europe, the problem of allocating authority between the central and regional government arising for the
American Court in Lopez, nonetheless, bears instructive parallels and
contrasts to the Maastricht Treaty case&apos;s distribution of legislative power.
The concrete issue in Lopez was whether the scope of congressional
legislative power could justify the federal enactment of a &quot;Gun-free
School Zones Act,44 criminalizing the possession of a firearm at local
schools. The &quot;first principle&quot; from which Chief Justice Rehnquist developed his opinion in support of the holding was the idea of limited govThe American

the Maastricht

-

-

ernmental power. This he derived from the concept of enumerated powers found in Article I of the Constitution.45 This concept is generally
given at least lip service as an axiom that Congress has no general legisla-

tive, welfare,

or

Rehnqu i

made it clear that the

to

s t

&quot;police&quot; authority,

put teeth back in the

axiom.

He

but only specific grants of power.
majority on the Court was prepared

grounded

the value of the

principle,

in

importance for the preservation of &quot;fundamental liberties.1146
Congress had proposed its enactment under the Commerce Clause of

turn, in

its

Article 1,

the several
empowering it to &quot;regulate commerce among
with
renewed
seriousness
the
idea
that
the
Taking
premise of limited government restricted Congress&apos;s ends to specifically enumerated
powers, the majority, for whom Rehnquist spoke, found itself oblistates.&quot;

44

18 U.S.C.

45

115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626, 633

S 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V).

article, the official United
author and
46
Id.

so

States

pinpoint citations

Reports
to

that

(1995).

version of the
source are not

At the time of the

opinion

was not

writing

yet available

of this
to

the

provided.

13 Za6RV 56/1-2
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gated

to

schools

decide whether the

was,

private deployment

of firearms

local

at

the several states.,,47

without more, &quot;commerce among

To resolve the issue, Rehnquist&apos;s opinion adopted, as its starting
point, the assumption that the clause had so to be interpreted that mean-

demonstrably appeared along with any concrete power recognized.48 Rehnquist scrutinized the adequacy of the Court&apos;s prior
rulings on the clause&apos;s scope in this light. Those rulings supplied a deferthe several
ential rule of interpretation, treating &quot;commerce among
states&quot; as encompassing any activity &quot;substantially affecting&quot; comingful

limits

merce

among the

with the
in his

paradigm

which

states

of

commerce

Congress wished to treat as commerce,
being (as justice T h o m a s emphasized

concurrence) buying and selling

or

transport for

and

purchase

sale.49

Lopez held that the premise of limited power required an
the inherited interpretive rule, which was so open-textured,

The Court in

adjustment

in

the scope of power being concretely recogconstitutionally adequate rule, Rehnquist
explained that the majority found it necessary to add, as a more specific
the several states&quot;
condition, the requirement that &quot;commerce among
be read thenceforth to mean only commercial activities, i.e. buying
and selling or transportation for purchase and sale, substantially affecting
commerce interstate.51 The new rule supported continued reliance on
substantial indirect effect to satisfy the textual requirement that a reguthe several states,&quot; or &quot;interstate&quot;, but no
lated activity be &quot;among
longer the textual requirement that it be &quot;commerce&quot;. The Court held
that Congress&apos;s &quot;Gun-free School Zones Act&quot; was a constitutionally inadmissable arrogation of power, because the introduction by teenagers of
guns into schools, for whatever indirect impacts on the national economy,
as to

entail

no

restriction

nized.50 To arrive

was not

at a

on

new,

itself economic

or

commercial in nature.52

significance commentators already ascribe to Lopez
holding&apos;s departure from nearly sixty years of precedent under-

The considerable
reflects the

47

Id.

48

The

court

reviewed the

power are inherent
131 L. Ed. 2d at 633.

merce

49

in

of its decisions

to

language of the

Commerce Clause.&quot; 15 S. Ct.

115 S. Ct. at 1630, 131 L. Ed. 2d

show that &quot;limitations

at

638; and 115 S. Ct.

at

on

50

115 S. Ct.

1633, 131 L. Ed. 2d

at

642.

51

115 S. Ct. at 1634, 131 L. Ed. 2d

at

643.

52

Id.

at

1643, 131 L. Ed. 2d

(T h o m as, J., concurring).
at

the

history

the very
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girding Congress&apos;s role in Franklin D. Roosevelt&apos;s New Deal, the Civil
Rights Movement, and America&apos;s adoption of the welfare state. The change
Lopez effects in the allocation of legislative power within the American
federal system does not appear on the opinion&apos;s face, however, but only in
relation to the larger body of American constitutional case law.
To grasp the exact nature of the change, one must first understand what
the holding leaves unaltered. Even after Lopez, Congress retains powerful
and wide-ranging legislative authority under a line of Supreme Court
going back

cases

McCullocb

to

Chief

Justice John Marshall&apos;s

1819

opinion

in

Maryland.53 Based on this precedent, Congress is still to be
viewed as enjoying its authority by direct constitutional grant from the
people, not state delegation, and its enumerated powers are still to be liberally construed as implying all secondary powers useful to their accomplishment.
Other precedent surviving Lopez ensures that the Commerce Clause
itself alots Congress the power to regulate any conduct, for any congressional motive, solely on condition that the conduct have an immediate
commercial dimension. Lopez does not disturb precedent permitting
Congress to prohibit racial discrimination on moral grounds, only on
condition that the discrimination regulated occurs in the course of economic activity.54 Congress may likewise continue to restrict extortionist
activity by gangsters on criminal justice grounds, because the enterprise
restricted has a commercial angle.55
Although the Tenth Amendment expressly allocates residual legislative
power to the states, precedent is still firmly in place for reading the
v.

amendment

tinuing
Lopez,
more

imposing

as

no

substantive limitations

on

Congress&apos;s

con-

wide-ranging power under the precedent already cited. Even after
the amendment continues to be viewed, as a &quot;truism&quot; yielding no

power

to

the

states

than whatever

legitimate legislative

power

re-

mains, after Congress is accorded its full reach of power under Article 1.56
53

17 U.S.

54

Katzenbacb

55

Perez

56

The

v.

(4 wheat.) 316,
v.

4 L.Ed. 579

(1819).

McClung,

United States,

379 U.S. 294, 85 S.Ct. 377, 13 L.Ed.2d 290 (1964).
402 U.S. 146, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971).

expression is from United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123 24, 61 S. Ct. 451,
462, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941), and it continues to be applicable, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Autbority, 469 U.S. 528, 551, 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1018, 83 L. Ed. 2d 1016 (1985),
r e h e a r i n g d e n i e d, 471 U.S. 1049, 105 S. Ct. 2041, 85 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1985), with the caveat only that the Court has found that procedural restrictions under the Tenth Amendment on the federal congress&apos;s ability to impose co-responsibility for its
policies on state

legislatures.

-

See New York

v.

United States, 505 U.S. 144, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 120 L. Ed. 2d 120

(1992).
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The
in

any

precise shift in congressional power wrought by Lopez does not lie
departure per se from reliance on the concept of commercial utility

define the federal grant of power under the Commerce Clause. Both
read in
new and the older approach emphasize that the clause must be
&quot;economic&quot; terms. The alteration lies, rather, in a repudiation of the idea

to

the

supplement the constitutional text to define Congress&apos;s
coherempowerment with comprehensive philosophical, or even logical
of
Congress&apos;s
ence, permitting a predictably expansive interpretation

that the Court

can

power.

According

to

the

majority

in

Lopez, Congress

is

be confined

now to

to

interpretation of its powers, than it has been in recent
decades. They are to be viewed as no more than discrete grants of practical authority, unassimilable to any overall philosophical justification. The
is allocated between state and federal level
is to ensure that
a more

functional

point

power

regard for the dynamics of power, rather than a coherphilosophy differentiating kinds of governmental responsibility for
of functional

out
ent

basic constitutional values.
To better grasp the rejected view, one needs merely to read the dissenting opinions of the members of the Court who did not endorse the majority position.57 That alternative stance argued, in effect, that Congress
to formulate overarching policies covering all dimensions
of national life under the Commerce Clause, on condition only that it
framed these policies in the idiom of economics. This minority position
would have allowed Congress to regulate teenagers carrying guns at local

should be able

schools for
an

raft of

a

overall

immediative motives, as long
schema ultimately tracing the

more

justificatory

as

it did

so

meaning

within

of such

regulated activities for producing
wealth.5&apos; In this view, congressional action would exceed its constitutional limit only where interests and values are inherently not susceptible
motives

the

to

consequences

of

reasoning, with such nonassimilable interests and values if
falling to the purview of the states.
any in
Justice Kennedy&apos;s concurrence illumines deeper grounds for the
Court&apos;s stated assertion that a lack of textual support requires a rejection
of sixty years of precedent tending to support the minority position.
Kennedy argues that Rehnquist&apos;s interpretation of the text lies not
in the inherent meaning of concepts or of any stable realities to which

to

economic

-

fact exist

-

65, 131 L. Ed. 2d

57

Lopez,

58

115 S. Ct. at 1651, 131 L. Ed. 2d

115 S. Ct.

131 L. Ed. 2d

at

677

at

1651-

at

666

at

665

-

84.

(S o u te r, J., dissenting) and

115 S. Ct.

(B r e y e r, J., dissenting).
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ing circumstances, the balance of federal and
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of
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States

preserving, in evolvpower, according to

Lopez is only the most recent, in a series of R e h n q u i s t Court cases
revising constitutional doctrines incrementally and across the board, for
the balance of power back towards the stateS.60 In the
at hand, the shift implies an option for the values of liberty and fairover the utility of a stronger central government, which was favored

the sake of
case
ness

tilting

Rehnquist&apos;s preference for the rule of law,
of fidelity to the text, over democracy, which
as national legislative policyrnaking, is to be interpreted in these underlying terms. In adjudicating division-of-powers
questions through such pragmatic balancing, the Court aims at placing the
Federal Congress, the States, and even itself, in a functional equilibrium,
subject to periodic adjustments to ensure popular satisfaction with the
system&apos;s concrete realization of freedom, fairness, and efficiency.
by

the Court&apos;s dissenters.

which he expresses in
he conceives, in turn,

III.

terms

Resolving Conflicts

over

the

The Abortion
A

complementary

route to

Scope of &quot;Public Morality&quot;:
Controversy

understanding

the distinct

roles, which the

constitutional systems accord basic values, leads via the protections
each grants individuals against invasions by state power. A particularly apt
two

matrix for this second line of

analysis

conflicts between

assertions of moral

inclinations

formed

by

the

adjudication

of

and individual

community
the community standard. In both Germany and
most aggravated recent controversy of this kind has been
norms

to contravene

America, the
over

is

abortion.

The German

The

current

Experience

response of the German Constitutional Court

cific issue of abortion

can

be found in its Second Abortion

the speopinion of

to

1993. The Court&apos;s

solve the

Second Senate had been called upon in the case to reconstitutionality of a &quot;no-fault&quot; scheme the Federal Parliament

59

115 S. Ct.

60

An

at

example

See, e.g., Sandin

v.

1660, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 677 (K e n n e d y, J., concurring).
area of procedural protections within the criminal

is the

Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293,

132 L. Ed. 2d 418

justice

system.

(1995).
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had adopted for regulating early abortion.61 The Court adopted the basic
value of the life of every human person as the starting point of its evaluation of the enactment.62 On the facts, it found human life to be present

implantation of the individuated embryo, the
by definition, under a law concerned with
entity
the &quot;interruption&quot; of pregnancy. It held that killing the fetus even in early
abortion was a presumptive violation of the constitutional order.63
as a

value from

at

least the

affected

earliest unborn

The Court examined the

concrete context to

tervailing

constitutional value

owed the

right

enactment.

of life

to

determine whether

might sufficiently

limit the

allow it, nonetheless, to sustain the
not find democracy to offer such

The Court could

weight because,

a coun-

recognition

legislative
a counter-

within the German constitutional order, that value is
to the very human dignity at issue in the right to life

itself accountable

itself.64 But, it found that the pregnant woman&apos;s life, bodily health, and
autonomous development of personality were such a separate value
sufficient under circumstances

constitutionally

owed the

right

at

least,

to

life.65

to

limit the

concrete

recognition

Where the pregnant woman demonstrated
interpreting the pregnancy as a threat to her

objectively grave reasons
life, physical health or the
development of her personality, the Court found the legality of abortion
compatible with a constitutional order vindicating the life of her unborn
child as an objective basic value.66 In such cases, therefore, abortion could
be considered justified and not constitutionally wrongful.
The Court held that a law permitting such abortions did not violate the
for

Constitution.67

61

Principally, §5 218 &amp; 219 of the Strafgesetzbucb as amended by the Gesetz. zum
Vorgeburtlichen/werdenden Lebens, zur F6rderung einer Kinderfreundlicheren
Gesellscbaft, fiir Hilfen im Schwangerschaftskonflikt und zur Regelung des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs (Schwangeren- und Familienhilfegesetz) 1992 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBIJ I
1398 -1402. The legislature wanted to leave the decision to the woman&apos;s individual conscience with an awareness of her responsibility, but without imposing objective limitations
on her reasoning. As such, the approach can be said to resemble the development in both
Germany and the United States of law permitting &quot;no-fault&quot; divorce, i.e. the legal recognition of the divorce decision without a showing of fault.
Schutz des

62

63

BVerfGE 88, 203, H (251).
Id. at 252, 255 56.
Protection of life was said by the Court
-

64

to

be the

&quot;Aufgabe

des

Gesetzgebers&quot;,

id.

at

254.
65

Id.

66

Id.

67

More

at 257.

precisely, the Court&apos;s formulation was that, through &quot;Unzumutbarkeit&quot;, no
&quot;Rechtspflicht&quot; to carry the child to term was &quot;aufzuerlegen&quot; by the state. It took care to
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was not the precise point in controversy. That, rather,
permissive regime of abortion, allowing abortion based on
the early phase of gestation alone and without a showing of objective
reason, was constitutional. The Court&apos;s response to this question was that
where a woman could establish no objectively grave reason for interrupt-

But such

was

law

a

whether

a

ing the pregnancy, the abortion

indefeasibly

life.68 The Federal Parliament

constituted

a

violation of the

constitutionally obligated to
right
treat the act as objectively wrongful at German law.69 No loosening of
legal restrictions could go so far as to alter the juridical status of an objectively unjustified abortion as an act wrongful within the constitutional
to

order of values. The Court,

was

thus, held the law,

as

enacted,

unconstitu-

tional.
The further
tary efforts

at

question the Court addressed, critical to future parliamenreform, was whether the constitutional obligation

abortion

respect the right to life which the Court found incumbent on the
legislature required it to criminalize objectively unjustified, early-term
abortions, or whether it left open the milder path of a program of &quot;public morality&quot; employing means other than criminal sanctionS.70 The Court
stipulated that to be acceptable any future legislative response to abortion
must safeguard the minimum inviolable content of the basic value of indito

vidual human life.71 It held further that this minimum called for

say that this concept did not
it relieve the state of an own

qualify

the

of care for a child, nor did
child, holding this latter duty
the mother to ensure that the child, if at all

general

ongoing duty of

maternal

some-

its own to

duty

the

to be properly expressed by state assistance to
possible, reach term, id. at 255 56, 259, 261. The Court noted the possibility of notions of
moral or religious duty to the unborn child which might be perceived by the individual as
requiring the carrying the child to term, notwithstanding the absence of a exactable legal
duty to do so, id. at 257.
68
Id.; the Court also held that it violated the &quot;Sozialstaatprinzip&quot;, id. at 319.
69
The Court held a no-fault regime in which &quot;die Rechtspflicht zum Austragen des
Kindes von Grundrechts wegen auch nur für eine bestimmte Zeit
generell aufgehoben
ware&quot; constitutionally inadmissible, id. at 255, on the ground that the admission of the act
as &quot;nicht rechtswidrig&quot; would compromise the integrity of the entire &quot;Rechtsordnung&quot;, id.
at 241. In their dissent, justices Mahrenholz and Sommer argued that the majority was
[das Gesetz] den Tatbestand
pursuing a distinction without a difference, &quot;ob
einengte
oder ob er einen Rechtfertigungsgrund setzte oder nur einen Schuld- oder Strafausschließungsgrund zum Inhalt hatte; in jedem Falle müsse der Eindruck entstehen, der
-

-

Abbruch sel&apos;rechtlich erlaubt&apos;
id. 356.
70 The
Court held that criminal sanctions had to remain an &quot;ultima ratio&quot;
order, but need not be used in every circumstance, id. at 253, 258.
71

Id.

at

in

the

legal

254.
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thing

than

more

matter:

namely,

jective right

to

it

simply validating that value as an abstract juridical
required as effective as possible a protection of the sub-

life of all unborn children threatened with abortion.72

The Court examined the facts of abortion

to

determine what minimum

adequately safeguard the individual
risk by abortion and properly uphold unjustified
human
abortion status as constitutionally wrongful. Where the former requirement was concerned, the Court ascertained that circumstances inherently
relating to early pregnancy and abortion historically had made criminal
sanctions ineffective in eliminating abortion.73 The Court took notice as
well of empirical arguments that counselling and social support for pregnant women were more useful than criminal sanction in lowering the

legal devices
lives placed at

concrete

would both

abortion rate.74 It concluded

that, where

certain

conditions

were

satisfied,

counselling and social support schema could be a constitutional alternative to criminalizing early-phase abortion.75
A first condition was that the scheme&apos;s counselling component aim at
more than merely a decrease in the frequency of unjustified abortion. The
Court stipulated that such counselling must educate the woman considering unjustified abortion concerning its wrongful character and the desirability, where countervailing reasons are not objectively present, of continuing pregnancy to term.76 The requirement flowed from the Court&apos;s
judgement that the constitutional order was capable of absorbing decriminalization of early abortion in essential part, only by relying on the moral dignity of the mother&apos;s decision, as a separate, objective constitutional
value.77 The legislature could employ counselling as a response to abortion, therefore, only where it observed the objective requirements of
genuinely ethical reasoning.78
a

72

id.

at 251

73

Id.

at

74

and 261.

263

-

66.

not perceive that the woman was pregnant in the early phase
of pregnancy, 1d. at 266.
75 Id.
65. In this key conclusion, the Court departed from its conclusion in its
at 264
1975 abortion decision that the criminalization of unjustified abortion was required,
BVerfGE 39, 1, 46 47, and adopted a position which in some ways resembled the outlines

Notably,

outsiders could

-

-

of

justice

Rupp

76

Id.

77

Id. 272.

78

Id.

at

at

-

v o n

B

r

ii

n n e c

k&apos;s 1975

dissent, id.

at

79

(dissenting opinion).

270 and 276.

281.
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consid-

that any legal permission of objectively unjustified abortions
with provision made for winnowing out applications made

from external pressure, rather than internal decision.79 The Court, thus,
held that the state was required to assure the woman of adequate social

support

on

the birth of her

baby.80

Procedures had

to

be

developed

to

protect her from undergoing abortion to satisfy third-party pressure.81
Finally, the Court stipulated that the preservation, which it mandated,82

of the

juridical status of unjustified abortion as constitutionally wrongful
legally allowed was incompatible with the subsidy of unjustified abortion from insurance funds pooled for health, since such payment
would necessarily imply that the procedure objectively advanced life or
health.83 In a related restriction, the Court held that the medical profession could constitutionally perform unjustified abortions only within a
framework of professional ethics grounded in principled adherence to the
value of each individual human life from at least the time of implantaeven

where

tion.84

holding to interfere no more in the interests of
pregnant women than actually necessary to advance constitutional values,
holding, for instance, that the dignity of women undergoing abortions
merited confidentiality without regard to the constitutionally justified or
unjustified character of their actions.85 Similarly, it stipulated that the
legislature could, without constitutional offense, pay the costs of poor
women&apos;s unjustified abortions, if it drew on social insurance set aside for
guaranteeing a minimum living standard rather than from health-pooled
funds, since the former implied support only for the woman&apos;s subsistence,
not the objective rightfulness of her act.86
The Court tailored its

79

Id.

at

296

80

id.

at

259.

81

Id.

at

253 and 260.

132

id.
Id.

at

273.

83

-

97.

315; the Court held, by contrast, that medical contracts arising in the context
constitutionally unjustified abortions could be enforced, without compromising the legal system&apos;s fidelity to the value of human life, conditional only on the exclusion of damages for &quot;wrongful life&quot; claims, id. at 295 96.
84
See generally id. at 289 96. The Court&apos;s term was &quot;arztlich verantwortbar&quot;, id. at
292. The Court stated that one specific duty was to withhold information identifying the
gender of unborn children, unless medically necessary, to prevent gender-specific abortions.
It also held that physicians had a constitutional right of conscientious objection to performing abortions, id. at 294.
at

of

-

-

85
86

Id.
Id.

at

317.
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through its decision
fact, wherever possible, of existing unborn lives

The realization of basic values the Court intended
included the

protection in
killing of abortion; the moral integrity of physicians and family
counsellors; and, ultimately, a commitment to, and defense of, life&apos;s value
on the broadest possible societal basis. The decision had structural consequences for the allocation of responsibility for realizing the value of individual life, for it allowed the legislature to shift such responsibility from
governmental organs charged with criminal justice, to ones concerned
with social welfare, and, to a not insignificant degree, from government itself, to society in all its reaches. As the realization of the latter developfrom the

ment,

the Court envisioned intermediate social institutions with social

engaged in counselling,87 and, through the levy of tax
population mobilized in support of counselling and
social services fostering respect for jife.
The Federal Parliament had judged national unity to warrant a loosening of abortion restrictions in the wake of increased moral pluralism following the incorporation of the Ldnder of the former Soviet Zone.88 In its
service credentials

revenues, the

whole

1993 Abortion

decision,

the Constitutional Court demanded

a more nu-

legislative judgement. It validated the legislature&apos;s search for new
and different strategies in further national unity on changing facts, but it
would not concede the legislature authority to come to such unity by objectively abandoning a core constitutional value. Common respect for obJective values as fundament of German national identity was foremost
among the values the Court sought to realize.89
anced

The American

Experience

comparison of the role American constitutional interpretation assigns
adjudicating conflicts&apos;between legislatures and individuals
over public morality, more specifically, about abortion, relies most appropriately on the United States Supreme Courts 1992 opinion in Casey v.
A

basic values in

87

Id.

88

Id.

at

304, 261.

219. The issue had been left open in the Unification Treaty. Einigungsvertrag,
Aug. 31, 1990, art. 31(4). 104 Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesreglerung Bulletin
877 (1990); Peter H. M e r k 1, German Unification in the European Context 176
80
at

-

(1993).
89

On

reasoning

August 21, 1995, the Federal Parliament enacted legislation implementing the
of the Constitutional Court analyzed here, Schwangeren- und FamilienhiffeHnde-

rungsgesetz, 1995 BGBL 1050 -1057.
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of Southeastern Pennsylvania. The case reviewed the
of Pennsylvania&apos;s law on abortion.90
constitutionality
As in Germany, the issue before the Court was whether a legislative
construal of abortion as a question of public morality was constitutional.
But the American court&apos;s more specific formulation effected a dramatic
reversal. It phrased the problem as whether the legislature may treat abortion as a concern in public morality, in contrast to a &quot;no-fault&quot; exercise of
freedom, guaranteed by the Constitution.91
justice O&apos;Connor&apos;s plurality opinion in support of Casey&apos;s holding
adopted 14th Amendment liberty as its starting point. 92 More concretely,
it found that this concept had a twofold relevant meaning: &quot;liberty relating to intimate relationships, the family, and decisions about whether or
not to beget or bear a child and bodily integrity&quot;;93 and freedom from
governmental coercion in decisions over &quot;medical treatment&quot;.94
O&apos;Connor proposed both as broad enough to embrace a woman&apos;s
decision to abort, but noted that, should the recognized scope of such
Planned Parenthood
of

state

freedoms be considered
as a matter

of

stare

for the purpose, Roe v. Wade95
sufficient to sustain that right.

too narrow

decists

alone,

was,

Caught in the skeins of obvious doubt arising from her personal judiphilosophy over the inclusion of abortion within the meaning of fourteenth amendment liberty, O&apos;Connor was found to assert that a single
cial

precedent assured abortion of constitutional protection sans the further
grounding that might be found lacking in history or reason.96 The
precedent&apos;s unique force in this regard was, in any event, stated by
O&apos;C o n n o r to be a double one. Roe had resolved an intense public
dispute over a controverted value, and American women had relied upon
it in since arranging their economic livelihoods.97
90

that

2791, 2803, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1992) (ruling

112 S. Ct.

SS 3203
Reports

-

3220

[1990]).

version of the

source are not

91

112 S. Ct.

at

92

112 S. Ct.

at

At the time of the
case was not

96
97

v.

Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,

2810, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 702 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of
261, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 111 L.Ed.2d 224 [1990]).
410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2810 -16, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 701- 709.
112 S. Ct. at 2809, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 701; the general test for the force of precedent
112 S. Ct.

Healtb,
95

18 Pa. Cons.Stat.

provided.

2816, 120 L. Ed. at 709.
2804, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 695.
93
112 S. Ct. at 2810,120 L. Ed. 2d at 702 (citing Griswold
85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 [1965]).
94

on

of this article, the official United States
yet available to the author and so pinpoint citations to

writing

at

497 U.S.

which the Court

.change

in

set out was

premise

phrased

of fact&quot;. 112 S. Ct.

in
at

terms

of

&quot;unworkability&quot;, &quot;anachronism&quot;,

2816, 120 L. Ed. 2d

at

and

709.
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The Court found the 14th Amendment
terminate

right

to

most

of the
it

jected
thereby
was

term

The

pregancy.98

of pregnancy

regulation

to
to

a

encourage

not

guarantee to confer the
law had with respect to

prohibited abortion, but merely subpublic morality, seeking indirectly

of

as a matter

a

liberty
Pennsylvania

reduction in the abortion rate.99 The critical issue

whether the burdens this scheme

imposed

on women

seeking

abor-

tions violated the Constitution.

inquired whether a countervailing value existed sufficient
to justify limiting the abortion right to the extent of the Pennsylvania statute. She found such a value, at least potentially, in democratic decisions
over matters of legitimate societal interest.100 More specifically, she found
O&apos;Connor

the life of the child
tial basis for

to

limiting

constitute such

an

interest

abortion. Where the fetus

and, thus, to be a poten&quot;viable&quot;, currently for

was

about the last three months of pregnancy, she observed that this interest
was sufficiently weighty to justify prohibiting abortion, at least where no

countervailing

material maternal interest in life

or

health could be shown

militate in favor of the

procedure.101

Where the fetus

&quot;nonviable&quot;, currently for about the first

to

was

six

months of pregnancy, the plurality asserted that the State&apos;s interest in the
child was too light to justify proscribing even elective abortions, but suf-

ficiently weighty to support indirect burdens on the exercise of the right
of abortion through a scheme regulatory of public morality.102 On this
critical point, Casey overturned the specific holding of Roe v. Wade.

98

Id.

99

112 S. Ct.

100

born child

or

scope of the

pointed
sions

2803, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 693 94.
2817, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 710. The American decision assumes that the unfetus has no constitutional right to state protection, and it inquires merely the
at

-

112 S. Ct. at

legislature&apos;s perogative

to

confer such

protection.

Gerald Neuman

has

that the salient distinction between the German and American abortion decibe generalized beyond the right of the unborn child or fetus to state protection.

out

can

that the deeper issue is whether the recognition of rights extend to protection
private third-party interference. Gerald L. N e u m a n, Casey in the Mirror: Abortion,
Abuse and the Right to Protection in the United States and Germany, 43 American journal
of Comparative Law 273, 295 314 (1995) [hereinafter Am. J. Comp. L.J. N e u m a n contrasts the German approach with DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services,
489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct.998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), in which the United States Supreme
Court held that a 4-year-old boy threatened with violence, known to the state, by an adult
caretaker had no right to protective state intervention. For contrasting German law, see the
&quot;Drittwirkung&quot; doctrine. Peter E. Q u i n t, Free Speech and Private Law in German Constitutional Theory, 48 Maryland Law Review 247, 339 47 (1989).
He

notes

from

-

-

101

112 S. Ct.

at

2816 -17, 120 L. Ed. 2d

102

112 S. Ct.

at

2818, 120 L. Ed. 2d

at

at

710.

712.
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State power to advance an interest in the nonviable fetus during the first
two-thirds of pregnancy, moreover, reached its limit, according to

O&apos;Connor,

threshold

at a

That

point
.any substantial obstacle&quot;

proscription.
Such

was

the

considerably lower than attempts at outright
said by O&apos;C o n n o r to be encountered in

was

essence

to the procurement, in fact, of an abortion.
of the Court&apos;s new &quot;undue burden&quot; test.103

Within the limit of &quot;no undue burden&quot;, the plurality upheld all of
Pennsylvania&apos;s regulations aimed at informing the woman of the state&apos;s
preference for childbirth over abortion, and at making sure that her deciwas both reasonably well considered and duly informed of the objecphysiological characteristics of her unborn offspring at the time proposed for its abortion.104 The Court struck down only one term in the
law, which imposed a conditional duty on married women to attest that
they had notified their husbands of their intention to abort. The ground
was the undue burden the Court perceived in an implicit invitation to
third-party pressure before the procedure, and to physical or moral retal-

sion
tive

iation after it.105

Both the

effect,

plurality&apos;s practical purpose, and the holding&apos;s immediate
give greater legislative scope to expressions of disapproval

were to

at a reduction in its incidence, without, howof national unity which would have flowed from permitting individual states to adopt conflicting hierarchies of abstract value.
The plurality&apos;s methodology in reaching its result had meaning for the

of abortion and
ever,

the

to

efforts

disruption

American constitutional

goals.
Significantly,

framework, however, that

went

beyond

its

con-

crete

relatively traditionalist justices joining in
O&apos;Connor&apos;s opinion were unwilling to limit the extratextual sources
of fourteenth- amendment liberty to traditions or concepts validated
within the history of American and English law and jurisprudence in the
once familiar manner of a Harlan or Frankfurter, and ranged instead into
the still relatively novel realm of concepts of bodily autonomy and of the
value-creating capacity of judicial will.
Significantly, too, these same justices chose to limit the authority of the
state
not federal
legislature to advance moral or metaphysical concepts
of value, as opposed to material interests. An ancillary value of the democratic decisions of American state legislatures has long been their perpet-

the

-

103

112 S. Ct.

at

104

112 S. Ct.

at

105

112 S. Ct.

at

2819, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 712 -13.
2822
26, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 717 21.
3 1, and 120 L. Ed. 2d at 721- 28.
2826
-

-

-
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uation

of ancient

equitable

and moral

embedded in the states&apos;

principles

common-law

traditions, traditions previously enriching and offsetting the

functional

utilitarian modes of

or

the

justification the Constitution requires of

the federal level.

legislature
Casey plurality&apos;s interpretations both
liberty and democratic decision represent a
at

The

reasons

When

counting

one

as

rational, within the

seeks the

deeper ground,

of the

meaning of individual

constriction of the kinds of

American constitutional scheme.

one

confronts

a

concern

with the

balance of power, similar to that seen in Lopez.
If Casey had held the reverse, and permitted states to permit or proscribe abortion according to majority will, a serious clash of modes of

rationality and moral reasoning among states might have been feared, even
to the point of jeopardizing the nation&apos;s unity. justice Kennedy&apos;s concurrence in Lopez suggested that the Court&apos;s textual interpretations might
hinge on a pragmatic assessment of the balance of power in the federal
scheme. Casey can fairly be read as standing for the same proposition. Its
resolution of the issues before it facially allocated power between the
individual and the state, but, on another level, it aimed at a desired balance
of national unity and local independence. Its contribution to this project
was

its

state as

prescription
well,

as at

of

utility

and individualism106

the national level, for

The materials reviewed here have been
emerging

resonate

cultures which

the

language at the
topics.

Concluding Reflections

IV

with

as

divisive moral

resolving

deepseated

current Ones,

but the

pictures

traditional differences between the

anglo-saxon, processsystem
continental, substanoriented, pragmatic, and individualistic; another
tive, communitarian, and principled. Evaluating the realization of basic
values within each system requires that German and American solutions

legal

are

in

view:

one

-

-

particular problems

to

only against the backdrop of apprelanguages.
interpretation of basic values relies on a prudential

be considered

ciation for differences in national constitutional
In both systems, the

judgement

106

to

close the gap between constitutional concepts and their

plurality justified the Court&apos;s holding
liberty is the right to define one&apos;s own

The

on

the individualist

ground

that &quot;[a]t the

concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under the compulsion of the state&quot;, 112 S.
heart of

Ct.

at

2807, 120 L. Ed. 2d

at

698.
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requirements in new and changing situations.107 In the German system,
judgement principally matches the material content of new situations

this

with the forms of inherited concepts, but, as both German cases have
shown, it extends also to an ancillary process of creating new structural

relationships within government and society. In the American system, the
judgement in question goes primarily to allocating freedom and power,
but,

have

seen from the cases considered, it requires, as well, anand, as could be developed in a more extensive review of
American case law, in its own fashion, affirming the source, nature, and

as we

guishing

over

direction of basic values.
The right prudential judgement in each system, then, involves the same
elements but in a different order. Common to both systems is the over-

arching requirement that the judgement linking the formal constitutional
value and its realization in fact combine the due degree of closure and
openness.108 If an evalution were to be undertaken of the cases considered
here, or of the tendencies they expose in their respective interpretive traditions,

it

would c&apos;enter

Specifically,

one

on

might

the

correctness

of this

prudential

ask whether the American

balance.

opinions find the best

balance between pragmatic openness to uniting the country around an national market and closure in relation to norms of integrity in interpretive
and moral reasoning. Of the German cases and their interpretive tradition,

might inquire into the source of German assurance of striking the
right balance between closure represented by commitment to jurisprudential norms and values and openness to a future defined by
rapidly integrating economic markets relativizing and flattening the European moral
and cultural traditions on which the German interpretative tradition undoubtedly depends.
one

107 The
but also in

two

systems can find common ground, not only in hermeneutical methodology,
social and political problems calling for resolution: &quot;Despite differing

concrete

historical

the liberal democracies
legacies and cultural settings,
are wrestling with
problems&quot;, Mary Ann Glendon, General Report Individualism and
Communitarianism in Contemporary Legal Systems: Tensions and Accommodations, 1993
Brigham Young University Law Review 385, 412.
108 Winfried
B r u g g e r describes this tension as being one of &quot;Flexibilitat&quot; and
&quot;Rigidität.&quot; Winfried B r u g g e r, Konkretisierung des Rechts und Auslegung der Gesetze,
119 Archiv des 6ffentlichen Rechts 16 (1994); for a
general schema of possibilities of
hermeneutical methodology, see Winfried Brugger, Legal Interpretation, Schools of
jurisprudence, and Anthropology: Some Remarks From a German Point of View, 42 Am.
J. Comp. Law 395 421 (1994).
certain

common

-

-
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Rather than to presume to include such a substantive evaluation within
its scope, the present article will conclude with a question which, it is

hoped,

will stimulate further reflection

on

the meaning and direction of

the evaluation called for. The German and American abortion cases support legislative schemes remarkably similar&apos;09 in their legal permissions,

prohibitions and commands regarding the act of abortion, and, yet, they
give virtually opposing accounts of the jurisprudential meaning of the
What is one to make of this? What does it
countries&apos; respective laws
portend for the future?
-

109

The pattern of similarity and difference between the two legal regimes on the
question of abortion should not be oversimplified. Similarity extends, for example, beyond
the positive scope conferred on the freedom of abortion to a common judicial willingness
to intervene in the democratic resolution of the question. And difference goes beyond the
divergent moral interpretations the respective national courts give to freedom of abortion.
A critical difference in the permission legally conferred lies in the far more restrictive time
limit imposed on abortion in Germany. German law gives far greater protection to the child
developing in utero by restricting abortion to a time far ealier in pregnancy. The judicially
imposed American solution is more permissive than was even the legislation seeking to
accomodate a newly integrated population accustomed to abortion on demand in communist East Germany, which the German Court overturned. The American regime appears
unique in its willingness to guarantee the availability of the abortion procedure so far into
pregnancy.
Wall Street

Mary

Ann

Glendon, U.S. Abortion
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at
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